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Abstract
We study the impact of social capital in both simple theoretical and em-
pirical model with the main assumption is the price of physical capital is a
decreasing function of social capital. In our theoretical model, there exists
a critical value such that firm will not invest in social capital if its saving is
lower than the critical value and otherwise. Moreover, the output depends
positively and non-linearly on the social capital. Our empirical model that
captures the impact of physical capital, human capital, and social capital
using the database from Survey of Small and Medium Scale Manufactur-
ing Enterprises (SMEs) in Vietnam 2011, confirms the conclusions of the
theoretical model.
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1 Introduction
Capital is one of the major elements that support the entrepreneurs in their produc-
tion and business activities. The more capital firms own, the easier they improve
quantity and quality of their tools and machines, consequently the higher prof-
itability level they could achieve. Today, in sophisticated economies, the concept
“capital” does not simply stand for “physical capital”, it also implies non-physical
resources such as “human capital” in the form of managerial talent as well as
education and training, skills of the labors working in enterprises, etc.; and “so-
cial capital” in the form of social networks, the relationships between individuals,
norm, trust that have certain impact on the firm productivity.
In the recent years, there are a mass of studies on social capital as well as its
e↵ects on a very wide-ranging set of socioeconomic phenomena (Durlauf 2002a;
Krishna 2001). Through researches, the concept of social capital is still being dis-
cussed and developed despite a lack of an agreed upon and consistent definition.
Bourdieu (1986) classifies social capital as the aggregate of the actual or potential
resources which are linked to possession of a durable network of more or less insti-
tutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance or recognition (Bourdieu 1986,
p. 248) and made up of social obligations (‘connections’), which are convertible,
in certain conditions, into economic capital and may be institutionalized in the
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form of a title of nobility (Bourdieu 1986, p. 243).
The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and
the World Bank also have their own definitions of social capital. According to
OECD, social capital is defined as “networks together with shared norm, values
and understanding that facilitate co-operation within or among groups” (Cote
and Healy, 2001:41). The World Bank suggests that “Social capital refers to the
institutions, relationship, and norms that shape the quality and quantity of a
society’s social interaction. Social capital is not just the sum of the institutions
which underpin a society it is the glue that holds them together.”
However, the most popular definition belongs to Putnam (1993, 1995, and
2000) who successfully exported the concept out of academia and into the wider
media and is also the most well-known theorist within the social capital paradigm.
He showed that social capital is the “features of social organization such as net-
works, norms, and social trust that facilitate coordination and cooperation for
mutual benefit” (Putnam 1995, p. 67). Despite the diversity in definition, the
widespread application of the concept verified the importance of social capital.
Through researches, authors have provided generous evidence of its influence on
political, economic and social aspects (Fine 2001; Jack and Jordan 1999; Mont-
gomery 2000).
Kurt Amen (2001) pointed out the potential trade-o↵ between sustainability
of self-enforcement and the magnitude of gains from trade in social networks as
an explanation. Based on an infinitely repeated multi-player prisoners’ dilemma,
the paper showed that inclusive social capital could combine both low enforcement
cost and high gains from trade. Similarly, B.R. Routledge and J. von Amsberg
(2003) used the structure of the prisoners’ dilemma to describe the trade between
3
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two people and introduced a theoretical growth model in which they defined and
characterized social capital as the social structure which facilitates cooperative
trade as equilibrium. The key assumption of their model was that technological
innovation, which drives growth, involves a reallocation of labour that a↵ects social
capital. The connections between growth, labour mobility, and social capital were
explored by the combination of trading model and growth model.
Besides theoretical studies, many empirical studies verified the e↵ect of social
capital on economic growth. Using three measures: (i) an index of the extent
of civic community; (ii) an index of various direct measures of the e↵ectiveness
of regional government; and (iii) survey of citizen satisfaction with their regional
governments, J.F. Helliwell and R.D. Putnam (1995) showed that there was a
strong convergence of per capita incomes among the Italian regions during the
1960s and 1970s, and the more social capital a region has, the faster convergence
is, as well as the higher equilibrium income level is. They also provided evidence
of a sharp reversal of convergence in the period 1983 1990, indicated by increasing
in the levels of real per capita GDP among regions since the regional government
reforms. In the USA, there is an outstanding diversity of social capital by region
(S.Iyer, M. Kitson, and B.Toh 2005). The social capital data from the Social
Capital Community Benchmark Survey 2000 showed education is important for
almost indicators of social capital, and ethnic diversity is associated with lower
levels of social capital.
The role of social capital is also verified through cross-country empirical works.
S.Knack and P. Keeper (1997) realized that trust and civic norm are stronger
in countries with higher and more equal incomes, with institutions that restrain
predatory actions of chief executives, and with better-educated and ethnically
homogenous populations. Meanwhile, they denied the role of Putnams measure of
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social capital memberships in formal group that is not associated with improved
economic performance. A study on a cross section of 54 European regions also
confirmed that growth di↵erentials in European regions are positively related to
social capital as associational activity (S.Beugelsdijk, T. Schaik 2004). In case of
Africa, social capital is one of three most important initial conditions that mainly
a↵ect growth by determining policy outcomes; developing countries with relatively
low social capital seem more likely to have bad policy outcomes, low investment
and slow growth (J. Temple 1998).
Recently, W.Stam, S.Arzlanian, and T. Elfring (2013) have conducted a meta-
analysis of the link between entrepreneurs’ personal networks and small firm per-
formance to examine the role of social capital in the entrepreneurial process. The
authors collected the population of 59 empirical studies (of which 10 are unpub-
lished) that considered the relationship between social capital of entrepreneurs
and small firm performance. The results showed that the relationship is positive,
significant, and depends on the age of small firms, the industry and institutional
contexts they operate, and on the specific network or performance measures used.
In Vietnam, there are 2 branches of research on social capital. The first branch
concerns the summary and introduction of the theory of social capital. Some ex-
amples of research papers produced this branch are “Understanding the concept of
social capital” (H.Q.Tran, 2006), “Social capital and Economics” (H.D.Tran, 2003
and 2006), “Social capital and Development” (N.B.Nguyen, 2006), “Capital and
Social capital” (Q.A.Nguyen, 2006) and “Social capital in Vietnam” (V.P.Nguyen,
2006), etc., however, these papers simply introduced and discussed the general
theory, and did not prepare a specified theory for empirical research. The second
branch focuses on empirical research. S.J.Appold and Q.T.Nguyen highlighted
the role of social capital in small enterprises’ performance. “Social capital, human
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capital and social networks some studies in Vietnam” (N.H.Le, 2008) discussed
some of the di↵erent concepts of social capital. T.A.Nguyen and Fleur Thomse
(2007) applied the concept of social capital to examine the phenomenon of land
consolidation in agricultural production through the study “Kinships and land
consolidation in term of social capital perspective in a North Central village”.
All of the studies mentioned above demonstrated the role of social capital in the
“Doi moi” (reform) period of Vietnam, it could help to promote industrialization,
modernization and international integration. However, almost all of these studies
were only concerned with kinship and limited their scope to the village level.
In this paper, we are able to analyze the e↵ect of social capital on productions
and business activities, using the database from Survey of Small and Medium
Scale Manufacturing Enterprises (SMEs) in Vietnam 2011. To the best of our
knowledge, this is the first time social capital is considered as a key determinant
of Vietnamese firm performance.
Our empirical analysis is guided by a theoretical model in which there exists a
certain value of total saving such that upon this threshold the investment in social
capital is e cient. Moreover, the more resourceful the social capital technology
is and/or the lower investment in social capital is required, the slighter the value
of total saving is needed. Our theoretical model also shows that the steady state
of the optimal path of total saving when firm invests in social capital is always
higher than the steady state of the optimal path without social capital.
Although, the theoretical model of B.R. Routledge and J. von Amsberg (2003)
focused more on the social aspect of social capital as influencing cooperative be-
haviour, and confirmed the ability of government to increase the social capital at
the expense of a less e cient allocation of labour by setting laws that reduce mo-
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bility like a rigid seniority system or harsh unemployment scheme, the authors did
not provide any empirical evidence. By contrast, we verified through our empirical
results that the social capital is not really a capital in the sense we cannot produce
with social capital as the only input.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the theoret-
ical model, analyzed the link between social capital and growth, and showed the
conditions that promote firms to invest in social capital. Section 3 presents our
data and shows the empirical model as well as its results. Section 4 summarizes
and concludes.
2 Theoretical Model
2.1 Model
We consider the Social Planner problem which consists to maximize the intertem-
poral utility of a representative consumer
max
{ct}
1X
t=0
 tu(ct)
where ct denotes her/his consumption at date t,   2 (0, 1) is the discount factor,
u is a strictly concave, strictly increasing function. The constraints for this agent
are, for any period t:
ct + Zt+1 +mt  F (kt, Lt) + (1   k)ptkt
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mt is the amount devoted for the social capital  t, Zt+1 is the amount devoted
for the purchase of the physical capital kt+1 which will be used in period t + 1
to produce the consumption good of this period. The technology used for that
is represented by the function F . This function is strictly concave, strictly in-
creasing, F (0, L) = 0. For simplicity, we assume exogenous labour supply and full
employment of labour. Hence, the production function does not involve labour
and we will write F (Kt) instead of F (Kt, Lt). Finally, pt is the price (in terms of
consumption good) of the physical capital.
Why is the social capital useful? Assume that the consumer (who is also the
producer of the consumption good) has on hand a quantity Z of savings (in terms
of consumption goods). The quantity of physical capital she gets is k = Zp . The
price p of the capital changes with the social capital. We assume that the price p
is a decreasing function of the social capital  .
We can also interpret slightly di↵erently the role of the social capital. Suppose
the firm wants to get a loan to buy a quantity of physical capital k with a saving
Z. Let q denote the price of the physical capital. If r is the interest rate, we then
have q(1 + r)k = Z. The unit cost of the physical capital now is p = q(1 + r). In
presence of the social capital, the interest r varies. Eventually it is negative (this
corresponds to a subsidy from the government) and p is lower than the market
price q. We assume the interest rate is a decreasing function of the social capital.
For simplicity, we assume that p = 1  and hence Z =
k
  .
We now suppose that with an amount m, the consumer will get a social capital
  =  (m) where   is a non decreasing function.
8
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Let St be the total saving at period t, i.e.
St = Zt+1 +mt
and ✓t is the share of this saving devoted to Zt+1. Then
Zt+1 = ✓tSt+1
mt = (1  ✓t)St+1, ✓t 2 [0, 1]
pt =
1
 t
The constraints for the consumer can be written as:
c0 + S1  F (k0) + (1   k)p0k0
ct+1 + St+2  F (kt+1) + (1   k)kt+1
 t
, for t   0
 F ( t✓tSt+1) + (1   k)✓tSt+1
where  t =  (mt) =   ((1  ✓t)St+1).
Let
H(S) = max
 
F ( ✓S) + (1   k)✓S : ✓ 2 [0, 1],   =   ((1  ✓)S) 
The problem of the social planner now becomes:
max
1X
t=0
 tu(ct)
9
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under the constraints
c0 + S1  F (k0) + (1   k)p0k0
ct+1 + St+2  H(St+1)
2.2 When does Firm invest in Social Capital?
In this section we will show that, when the technology   has a threshold then there
exists a critical value Sc such that if S < Sc then firm will not invest in social
capital and when S > Sc, it will do. We assume for simplicity that  k = 1 (full
depreciation of the physical capital), and
 (m) = 1, if m  mˆ
and  (m) = a(m  mˆ) + 1, a > 0, when m > mˆ
The parameter a measures the e ciency of the technology  .
Let us consider again the function H:
H(S) = max
 
F ( ✓S) : ✓ 2 [0, 1],   =   ((1  ✓)S) 
First, observe that, from the Maximum Theorem, H is increasing. We can write:
H(S) = max
 
F (  ((1  ✓)S) ✓S) : ✓ 2 [0, 1] 
Let ✓(S) denote the solution to this problem. We wonder whether exists Sc such
that 1  ✓(S) = 0 if S < Sc, and 1  ✓(S) > 0 if S > Sc.
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It is obvious that ✓(S) actually solves the problem
max{ ((1  ✓)S)✓ : ✓ 2 [0, 1]
Proposition 1 There exists Sc > mˆ + 1a such that 1   ✓(S) = 0 for S < Sc and
1  ✓(S) > 0 for S > Sc. Moreover, when a increases then Sc decreases, and when
mˆ increases then Sc increases.
Proof. Let G(S,✓ ) =   ((1  ✓)S) ✓ and Z(S) = max{G(S,✓ ) : ✓ 2 [0, 1]}.
(1) If S  mˆ then (1  ✓)S  mˆ for any ✓ 2 [0, 1]. In this case G(S,✓ ) = ✓ )
Z(S) = 1, ✓(S) = 1 and 1  ✓(S) = 0 (Firm will not invest in social capital).
(2) Now consider the case S > mˆ.
• (a) ✓   1   mˆS or equivalently (1   ✓)S  mˆ. In this case, G(S,✓ ) = ✓ )
Z(S) = 1, ✓(S) = 1 and 1  ✓(S) = 0.
• (b) Let 0  ✓  1  mˆS . The maximum cannot be obtained with ✓(S) = 0 since
if it is true then Z(S) = 0. If the solution ✓˜ is interior, i.e. ✓˜ 2 (0, 1  mˆS ) then
we get ✓˜ = 12(1  mˆS )+ 12aS . (This value is obtained by writing @G@✓ (S,✓ ) = 0).
It is smaller than 1  mˆS if, and only if, S > mˆ+ 1a .
Hence if S  mˆ+ 1a then ✓˜ = 1  mˆS . In this case  ((1  ✓˜)S)✓˜ = ✓˜ = 1  mˆS .
It is smaller than the value we obtained in (a). Hence, 1   mˆS cannot be
✓(S). We can summarize at this stage that S  mˆ+ 1a ) Z(S) = 1, ✓(S) =
1, 1  ✓(S) = 0.
Now, assume S > mˆ+ 1a . Again, ✓(S) > 0. If it is strictly smaller than 1 then
✓(S) = ✓˜ = 12(1  mˆS )+ 12aS . (This value is obtained by writing @G@✓ (S,✓ ) = 0).
11
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We have
G(S, ✓˜) =  (S) =
a
4S

S +
1
a
  mˆ
 2
=
a
4

S + 2(
1
a
  mˆ) + (1
a
  mˆ)2 1
S
 
We have
 0(S) =
a
4S2

S2   (1
a
  mˆ)2
 
Since S > mˆ + 1a , we have  
0(S) > 0. It is obvious that (+ 1) = +1.
When S ! mˆ + 1a , we have  (S)! 1amˆ+1 < 1. Hence there exists a unique
Sc > mˆ+ 1a such that ( S
c) = 1.
For mˆ + 1a < S < S
c we have  (S) < 1. Since G(S, 1) = 1, ✓(S) cannot be
less than 1. Hence ✓(S) = 1 and Z(S) = 1.
For S > Sc, we have  (S) > 1 and hence Z(S) > 1 with ✓(S) = ✓˜ =
1
2(1  mˆS ) + 12aS . One can easily check that ✓(S) < 1.
Observe that S > mˆ+ 1a ) S + 1a   mˆ > 0. We then get
@ ln( )
@a
(S) =
1
a
  2
a2

1
S + 1a   mˆ
 
=
1
a

S   (1
a
+ mˆ)
 
⇥ 1
S + 1a   mˆ
> 0
@ ln( )
@mˆ
=   2
S + 1a   mˆ
< 0
The graph of the function ( S)   1 shifts up when a increases. Hence Sc, which
is the unique solution to ( S)  1 = 0, decreases when a increases. Now, when mˆ
increases, the graph of ( S)  1 shifts down and Sc increases.
Interpretation (i) When the social capital technology is more e cient, the
critical value Sc decreases. (ii) It is natural that when the threshold of the tech-
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nology   increases, the critical value Sc becomes bigger.
Let  (S) =   ((1  ✓(S))S).
Proposition 2 Assume F (x
2)
x ! +1 when x ! +1. Then  (S)F ( (S)✓(S)S) ! 0
when S ! +1.
Proof. When S ! +1 then ✓(S) = 12(1  mˆS )+ 12aS ! 12 and  (S)S = a((1 ✓(S))S mˆ)+1S !
a
2 . Hence
 (S)
F ( (S)✓(S)S) is equivalent to
aS
2F (aS
2
2 )
and converges to 0.
Remark 1 Observe that the output is given by y = F ( k). Given k, since F is
concave, the ratio F ( k)/  decreases when   increases.
A function F which satisfies the assumption of Proposition 2 is F (x) = Ax↵,↵> 12 .
The interpretation of Proposition 2 is that the role of the social capital becomes
very small when Firm becomes very rich.
2.3 Growth and Social Capital
In this section, we study the contribution of the social capital to economic growth.
Assume that the function F is Cobb-Douglas, F (k) = Ak↵ with ↵ 2 (0, 1) and the
utility function u satisfies the additional assumptions that it is twice continuously
di↵erentiable and satisfies the Inada condition u0(0) = +1.
Let S¯ be defined by A↵S¯↵ 1 = 1  . This S¯ is the steady state to which will
converge the optimal path when Firm never invests in social capital.
We have the following preliminary results. Let {S⇤t+1}t 1 denote the optimal
sequence of the total saving.
Lemma 1 The optimal path (S⇤t ) is monotonic.
13
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Proof. From what we wrote above, for t > 0, the model can be stated as:
max
1X
t=1
 tu(H(St)  St+1)
s.t. 8t > 0, 0  St+1  H(St)
Since H is increasing and @
2u
@St@St+1
> 0, we apply the result in Amir (1996).
Lemma 2 Assume  (S¯) > 1. Then there exists T such that 1   ✓(S⇤T ) > 0, i.e.
Firm will invest in social capital at date T .
Proof. If Firm never invests in Social Capital then the optimal path (S⇤t ) will
converge to S¯. Since S¯ > Sc, there exists a date T with S⇤T > S
c. From Proposition
1, Firm will invest at T in social capital.
Lemma 3 The optimal path (S⇤t ) cannot converge to zero.
Proof. We have the Euler equation:
8t, u0(H(S⇤t )  S⇤t+1) =  u0(H(S⇤t+1)  S⇤t+2)H 0(S⇤t+1)
Let us compute H 0(0). It is obvious that H(0) = 0. We have
H 0(0) = lim
S!0
H(S)
S
= lim
S!0
AS↵ 1[ ((1  ✓(S))S)✓(S)]↵
When S is close to zero  ((1   ✓(S))S) = 1 and ✓(S) = 1. Hence limS!0 H(S)S =
+1.
Consider again the Euler equation. If S⇤t converges to zero, then, there exists
14
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T such that, for any t > T,   H0(S⇤t+1) > 1. This implies
u0(c⇤t ) = u
0(H(S⇤t )  S⇤t+1) > u0(c⇤t+1) = u0(H(S⇤t+1)  S⇤t+2), 8t   T
Equivalently, c⇤t+1 > c
⇤
T > 0, for any t > T . However, if S
⇤
t goes to zero then c
⇤
t
goes to zero too. We get a contradiction which ends the proof.
Lemma 4 Let S¯ denote the steady state of the optimal path of the total saving
when Firm never invest in social capital, and S˜ denote the steady state (if it exists)
of the optimal steady state of the optimal path with social capital. Then S˜ > S¯.
Proof. The steady states S¯ and S˜ are respectively defined by F 0(S¯) = H 0(S˜) = 1  .
Observe that F (S) = AS↵ and H(S) = AS↵ (S)↵. We then have:
1
 
= A↵S¯↵ 1 = A↵S˜↵ 1[ (S˜)↵ + S˜ (S˜)
↵ 1
 0(S˜)]
Since ( S˜) >  (Sc) = 1, 0 > 0, we have S¯↵ 1 > S˜↵ 1 or equivalently S˜ > S¯.
From these Lemma we obtain the main result of this paper.
Theorem 1 Assume  (S¯) > 1. Then there exists T such that 1 ✓(S⇤t ) > 0, 8t  
T , i.e. Firm will invest in social capital after date T . Either the optimal path will
converge to infinity (growth without bound) or converges to a steady state higher
than the one without social capital.
Proof. Since the optimal sequence (S⇤t ) is monotonic and cannot converge to
zero, there exists T such that S⇤t > S
c for any t   T . The remaining claims follow
Lemmas 1 - 4.
15
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We now give conditions for which the optimal paths (S⇤t ) will grow without
bound.
Theorem 2 Assume S¯ = (A↵ )
1
1 ↵ > mˆ and ↵ > 12 .
(i) Then there exists a¯ such that if a > a¯ then S⇤t ! +1 when t! +1.
(ii) And the ratio  tH(St) converges to zero when t goes to infinity.
Proof. (i) The idea is to prove when a is large enough, the equation H 0(S) = 1 
has no solution, i.e., there is no steady state for the optimal (S⇤t ). Hence this one
will converge to infinity.
We have
H(S) = A
⇣a
4
⌘↵✓
S +
1
a
  mˆ
◆2↵
and hence
H 0(S) = 2↵A
⇣a
4
⌘↵✓
S +
1
a
  mˆ
◆2↵ 1
Since S˜ > S¯, we have
H 0(S) > 2↵A
⇣a
4
⌘↵  
S¯   mˆ 2↵ 1
which converges to infinity when a converges to infinity.
(ii) The statement follows (i) and Proposition 2.
Comment If ↵ > 12 and the TFP A is su ciently large or the threshold mˆ is
small, then the economy which uses optimally the social capital, grows without
bound if the social capital technology is su ciently e cient. Second, the role of
the social capital diminishes when the revenue becomes very large.
16
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3 Empirical Results
3.1 Data Description
Prior to the econometric investigation of how social capital a↵ects firm perfor-
mance, it is useful to provide a description of dataset and some key variables used
in our study.
A firm-level dataset is compiled from database of the Survey of Small and
Medium Scale Manufacturing Enterprises (SMEs) in Vietnam. The survey is con-
ducted every 2 year and in 2011 the dataset contains information of over 2500
Vietnamese SMEs from 10 provinces. The total revenue of surveyed firms was
about 100 US billions. For each interviewed enterprise, two types of questionnaire
were taken: (i) the main questionnaire asked about various characteristics and
performance of enterprise; (ii) the labour questionnaire was to collect information
on wages, work and job satisfaction of workers. One advantages of using data from
Vietnamese SMEs survey is that it collects information about all aspects of busi-
ness activities such as enterprise history, production characteristics, investments,
assets, liabilities, credit, networks of enterprise and entrepreneurs, economic con-
straints and potential, etc. It is a fruitful source for study on Vietnamese SMEs
performance.
In Vietnamese SMEs survey, collected information about social capital of firm
are: (i) the information on social network such as the number of business contacts
that the manager/entrepreneur has, who is the most important contact for firm
performance, and the number of support the firm received from these contacts in
last year, etc.; (ii) the information about business associations that the firm partic-
ipates in such as the number of associations that the firm is their member, whether
17
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the members have to pay the fee or not, the reason why firm participated in these
associations, the assessment of firms about supportability of these association.
The Vietnamese SMEs database showed that the number of firms who are
participated in a formal business association is very modest, it decreased from
9.58% (equivalent to 270/2821 surveyed firms) in 2005 to 7.56% (193/2552 sur-
veyed firms) in 2011. In fact, Vietnamese business associations do not have the
key role in supporting the business activities of firms. Therefore, it is inappro-
priate to choose participating in associations or the number associations that the
firms participated in as a proxy for social capital. In our empirical model, the
total people with whom the manager/the entrepreneur has regular contact in their
business activities was chosen as the explanatory variable of interest. These con-
tacts include business people, bank o cials (both formal and informal creditors),
and politicians and civil servants, etc.
3.2 Empirical Specification
In our empirical model, we suggest that social capital has an e↵ect on revenue of
firms using the following regression specification:
lnRevenue =  0 +  1lnPhysical +  2lnLabour
+ 3lnProLabour +  4TotalContact
where lnRevenue measured as the logarithm of the total revenue of firm in the
end of 2010.
We include Total Assets (lnPhysical), Total Labour Force (lnLabour), and
Number of Professional Employer (LnProLabour) as standard control variables.
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All dataset are lagged one year, and computed in their log value. LnPhysical is
proxy variable for physical capital, LnLabour and LnProLabour are proxy variable
for human capital. Professional Employer is covered to estimate the impact of
labour quality on firm performance.
The proxy variable for e↵ect of social capital is TotalContact that indicates the
number of contact a firm has.
As the theoretical model implied, there exists a threshold Sc of total saving
such that if the total saving of firm is smaller than this threshold Sc, the investment
in social capital will be ine cient. In addition, the steady state in case of investing
in social capital is always higher than the one without social capital.
In empirical model, we analyse the impact of social capital and make an e↵ort
to prove that social capital only impacts on the performance of certain firms whose
revenue is larger than a critical value. Since proficient social capital also requires
a fixed cost, if the firm’s saving is not large enough, it could not invest in social
capital, or the social capital that it achieves could not support its performance.
Simultaneously, it should be noted that the higher revenue a firm reaches, the
larger saving it could make, as a result, only these firms could be employ social
capital as a determinant of its growth.
In order to examine whether the link between social capital and firm revenue is
nonlinear as we expected or not, as well as to detect the threshold, we regress the
log value of firm revenue on the proxy variables of social capital and the control
variables, using OLS regression and Quantile regression methods.
Quantile regression is a type of regression analysis used in statistics and econo-
metrics that intended to estimate, and conduct inference about, conditional quan-
tile functions. Whereas the method of least squares results in estimates that ap-
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proximate the conditional mean of the response variable given certain values of the
predictor variables, quantile regression methods o↵er a mechanism for estimating
models for the conditional median function, and the full range of other conditional
quantile functions. By supplementing the estimation of conditional mean functions
with techniques for estimating an entire family of conditional quantile functions,
quantile regression is capable of providing a more complete statistical analysis of
the stochastic relationships among random variables. Based on quantile regres-
sion, we could detect a critical value such that the model is significant in case of
all observations that are upper the critical value and otherwise.
3.3 Empirical Results
In our empirical model, we postulate that the revenue of firm is determined by
the elements listed in the censored regression. The empirical model predicts that
social capital a↵ects on firm performance in a certain range of revenue.
In tables 1 and 2, we introduce the results of OLS and Quantile regression
method at several levels of firm revenue, i.e., column QR(0.01) shows results using
quantile regression method which estimates the e↵ect of the change of conditioning
variables on the position of 1% level of quantile of the distribution of firm revenue
(the similar explanation for the other columns from QR(0.018) to QR(0.72)).
As can be seen in the table 1, in line with other standard control variables,
the number of contacts in business activities normally has a a rmative impact
on revenue of firm (indeed, the estimate of TotalContact variable is positive in
all regressions). In OLS regression, the estimate of TotalContact is positive, and
significant at 1% level. Generally, quantile regression is more robust to outliers
than OLS regression, and in case of social capital and revenue of firm, the me-
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dian estimate is not similar to the OLS point estimate. The di↵erence between
median and mean estimates could be clearly seen in the figure 1, the coe cient of
TotalContact in case of OLS method is slightly higher than in case of QR(0.5) -
Quantile Regression method at median level of firm revenue.
When we use quantile regression method and separate the dataset into 3 groups
as (i) the 1.8% of lowest revenue firms, (ii) the medium revenue firms (from 1.9
71%), and (iii) the 28% of highest revenue firms, we could receive di↵erent p-
values of TotalContact (as well as p-values of the other variables) for each group.
In quantile regressions, the firms are arranged in ascending order of their revenue.
For 1.8% of firms that have lowest revenue and 28% of ones that have highest
revenue, the estimate of TotalContact is insignificant at 10% level (p-values of
TotalContact in case of QR(0.018) and QR(0.72) are 0.341 and 0.102, respectively).
By contrast, the estimate is significant in case of 70% of firms whose revenue is at
medium level from QR(0.2) to QR(0.71).
In case of 1.8% of firms that have lowest revenue, it could be said that their
revenues are not large enough to saving and invest in e cient social capital or
e cient business contacts. This is appropriate with the results of our theoretical
model. However, it is clearly that the proportion of these firms is very small. The
role of social capital in Vietnamese SMEs performance is considerable so that a
very small firm should use social capital to improve their performance.
The insignificant estimate of social capital in case of firms that have highest
revenue provides evidence that social capital only has a certain e↵ect on firm
performance. In order to increase their revenue as well as their performance, firms
cannot only concern in their social capital, they also need to improve other types
of capital such as physical capital, human capital, etc.
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Based on above empirical results, we could see the fluctuation of the coe -
cient of TotalContact across each quantile level and conclude that firm revenue
a rmatively and non-linearly depends on the social capital.
4 Conclusion
This paper has explored the potential impact of the number of contacts in business
activities on firm performance, how and in which conditions firms should invest
in social capital in generally, and social network in particularly. The empirical
results were guided by a theoretical model that analyses the contribution of social
capital to economic growth and allows us to make progress along two lines. First,
we have showed if the saving is not large enough, or equivalently if the revenue is
very modest, it is not optimal for firms in social capital is not e cient. Second, we
have found out that social capital only has a certain e↵ect on revenue of firm; it
cannot take over from physical capital or human capital in order to produce goods
(i.e., by itself, social capital is not an input).
From the empirical results, we make two observations: (1) The elasticities
for the physical capital and labour are respectively around 0.3 and 0.7. That
corresponds to the usual values for a Cobb-Douglas production function. (2) The
empirical critical value of the saving is very low. If we interpret social capital as
lobbying or bribery, one may be attempted to say that bribery exists at almost
any level of the administration in Vietnam.
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APPENDIX: Empirical Results
Figure 1: The Quantile graphs of coe cients
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Table 1: Results of social capital and firm performance with OLS and quantile
regressions
OLS QR(0.01) QR(0.018) QR(0.02) QR(0.05)
LnPhysical 0.333*** 0.344*** 0.328*** 0.337*** 0.311***
(0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Labour 0.664*** 0.818*** 0.752*** 0.750*** 0.659***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
LnProLabour 0.238*** -0.009 0.081 0.132 0.210*
(0.000) (0.974) (0.654) (0.380) (0.090)
TotalContact 0.130*** 0.231 0.249 0.241* 0.206*
(0.001) (0.341) (0.111) (0.063) (0.054)
Constant 3.099*** 0.855 1.261*** 1.203*** 1.975***
(0.000) (0.211) (0.004) (0.001) (0.000)
Pseudo R2/ R2 0.7547 0.4220 0.4292 0.4299 0.4477
Obs 1408 1408 1408 1408 1408
Note: The table reports the results of estimation equation (1) corresponding to
each specified threshold. Robust errors are in parentheses underneath coe cient
estimates. ***, **, * indicate 1%, 5%, and 10% level of significance, respectively.
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Table 2: Results of social capital and firm performance with OLS and quantile
regressions (cont)
QR(0.10) QR(0.25) QR(0.50) QR(0.71) QR(0.72)
LnPhysical 0.291*** 0.273*** 0.331*** 0.343*** 0.340
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Labour 0.595*** 0.615*** 0.648*** 0.677*** 0.679***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
LnProLabour 0.323*** 0.343*** 0.234*** 0.199*** 0.206***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
TotalContact 0.179*** 0.160*** 0.118*** 0.084* 0.081
(0.002) (0.001) (0.009) (0.069) (0.102)
Constant 2.465*** 3.041*** 3.158*** 3.440*** 3.487***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Pseudo R2/ R2 0.4656 0.4895 0.5194 0.5362 0.5364
Obs 1408 1408 1408 1408 1408
Note: The table reports the results of estimation equation (1) corresponding to
each specified threshold. Robust errors are in parentheses underneath coe cient
estimates. ***, **, * indicate 1%, 5%, and 10% level of significance, respectively.
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